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THE RECONSTITUTION OF SELF-INCRIMINATION:
HARRIS v. NEW YORK'
In February, 1971, the United States Supreme Court rendered a de-
cision which is illustrative of the tendency of the current Court to limit
the scope of certain procedural safeguards thought, under the Warren
Court, to be dressed already in their full constitutional array. In a
short opinion written by Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices
White, Harlan, Stewart and Blackmun, the Court in Haris v. New
York 2 held admissible, for the purpose of impeaching the trial testi-
mony of a defendant, "trustworthy" prior statements uttered in re-
sponse to custodial interrogation and absent a valid waiver of the rights
enumerated in Miranda v. Arizona.3 The Court in Miranda had an-
nounced that unless a defendant were properly informed of his right
to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel, his pretrial
statements would be inadmissible, at least during the case in chief
of the prosecution.4 Lower courts had construed this prohibition to
extend even to the impeachment use of improperly garnered state-
ments.5 The Harris decision, though ostensibly only a limitation on the
lower courts' broad application of Miranda, represents a significant de-
parture from the principles espoused in that decision.
The petitioner, Viven Harris, was tried on two counts which charged
him with twice making illegal sales of heroin to an undercover police
officer. 6 At the time of his arrest Harris had been advised of his right
to remain silent and had been admonished that anything he said might
be used against him in a court of law.7 Harris had been made aware
of his right to have counsel present during any interrogation, 8 but he
had not been advised, as required under Miranda,9 that an attorney
would be appointed if he could not afford one.10 Subsequent to receipt
1. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
2. Id.
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. Id. at 479.
5. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 86-87 infra.
6. 401 U.S. at 222-23.
7. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246 (1969).
8. Id.
9. See text accompanying notes 35-44 infra.
10. 401 U.S. at 224.
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of this incomplete notice of his rights, Harris was questioned by an
assistant district attorney." During the course of the interrogation,
Harris admitted that he acted as the middleman for a narcotics agent
in one heroin transaction, 12 and that on another occasion he acted as
agent for the same undercover officer in the purchase of two glassine
bags of heroin from an unidentified individual. 13
At Harris' trial the government offered, during its case in chief,
testimony about the sales both from the undercover officer and from
a fellow officer who substantiated the collateral details." Chemical
analysis established the contents of the glassine envelopes to be her-
oin.15 Harris, electing to testify, denied obtaining narcotics for the
undercover agent on the first occasion,'" and insisted that the second
transaction was part of a scheme to defraud the aspiring heroin pur-
chaser with glassine bags containing only baking powder.' Excerpts
of Harris' statements transcribed during his interrogation at the po-
lice station were read into evidence "solely to impeach [his] credibil-
ity.""' After being advised that these statements touched only upon
Harris' credibility and could not be considered proof of guilt,19 the
jury found Harris guilty as charged on the second sale.2" They failed
11. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246.
12. Id. at 830, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
13. Id.




18. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d at 830, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
The use of the statement elicited defense objections on two grounds. Only one
of those grounds, the Miranda issue, reached the United States Supreme Court. The
other was based upon sections 813-f and 813-g of the New York Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure. Section 813-f requires that the defendant be given pretrial notice if the prose-
cution intends to offer a confession or admission into evidence; section 813-g provides
that a confession or admission shall not be admissible in evidence where a motion
to suppress such statement has been granted. 31 App. Div. 2d at 829, 298 N.Y.S.2d at
246. While not available to the jury, Harris' statement was marked in evidence at the
suggestion of the trial judge, with the consent of counsel, only to enable defense counsel
to peruse it. The Appellate Division concluded that it was "readily apparent that the
statement was not put in evidence in the truest sense of that word," and since sections
813-f and 813-g "are directed at evidence in its conventional form, . . . no pretrial
notice is required as to statements used solely for impeachment." Id. at 830, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 247. The Court of Appeals of New York agreed with this conclusion. 25
N.Y.2d 175, 177, 250 N.E.2d 349, 351, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71, 73 (1969).
19. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d at 830, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 247. Defense counsel
similarly admonished the jury in his summation. Id. at 830, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
20. Id. at 830, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 247.
NOTES
to reach a verdict on the count involving the earlier transaction.2'
Harris appealed without avail to the intermediate New York appel-
late court22 and later to the highest court in that state.2 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed his conviction
in a 5-4 decision.24
Speaking for the majority in Harris, Chief Justice Burger attached
no significance to either certain language in Miranda which was capable
of being interpreted as a bar to the use of uncounseled statements of a
defendant for any purpose, or the opinions of lower courts which had
so construed it. Brushing aside unspecified passages in the Mi-
randa opinion as mere dicta (and hence dismissing, without even
mentioning, lower court opinions based on that dicta), the majority
determined that where the evidence is trustworthy it does not follow
from Miranda that the evidence may not be used for impeachment
purposes. If a defendant attempts to use the exclusion of illegally
obtained statements as a shield for the commission of perjury, the
accused may be impeached by the use of these statements on matters
bearing collaterally or directly on the crimes charged. Once a defend-
ant has voluntarily undertaken to testify, he is under a duty to speak
the truth, and the prosecution has the right to use the time-tested
tool of impeachment if he speaks falsely.26 The majority noted that
the jury is aided in gauging a defendant's credibility by the impeach-
ment process.17  Finally, the majority viewed any spectre of police
misconduct flowing from the instant decision to be highly speculative.
It was their belief that the exclusionary rule works a sufficient deterrent
to police misconduct when illegally obtained statements are made un-
available during the prosecution's case in chief.
28
Justice Black dissented without opinion.29 Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices Douglas and Marshall, registered a strong dissent. Justice
Brennan argued against permitting the use of the tainted statements
on four grounds. First, the exclusionary rule of the Fifth Amendment,
21. Id. The earlier count, relating to January 4, was subsequently dropped by the
State. 401 U.S. at 223 n.1.
22. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1969) (3-2 decision).
23. People v. Harris, 25 N.Y.2d 175, 250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1969) (per
curiam).
24. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).,
25. Id. at 224.
26. Id. at 225-26.
27. Id. at 225.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 226.
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as settled in Miranda, protects an individual from being forced "'to
incriminate himself in any manner.'"30 The majority opinion, Bren-
nan asserted, engrafts a significant exception to that rule by permitting
unlawfully obtained statements to be used for impeachment.3 Sec-
ond, in presenting the government with the opportunity to use a tainted
statement to impeach a defendant who has the temerity to testify, the
majority opinion denies the defendant an "unfettered" choice of whether
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
He may thus be compelled to exercise it." Third, the rationale under-
lying the Miranda decision-the deterrence of improper custodial con-
duct by the police-is vitiated by the majority decision since law en-
forcement officers may now freely interrogate the unadvised and suf-
fer only small consequence at the trial.33  Indeed, they may reap a bene-
fit. Fourth, the majority opinion ignores the overriding principle that the
constitutional foundation of the privilege against self-incrimination is
an abiding concern that the government not act ignobly and that the
nation's courts refuse to abet such conduct.34
In Miranda3" the Court had considered the extent to which the
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege extended beyond the
realm of the criminal courtroom, and whether absence of counsel dur-
ing in-custody interrogation might be sufficient to taint with unconsti-
tutionality any statements obtained from an accused.36 Building on
the foundation laid in Escobedo v. Illinois,3 7 the Miranda majority
erected around custodial interrogation a framework of procedural safe-
guards which are prerequisite to the admissibility of a confession arising
from such questioning. 38 Starting from the premise that the Fifth
30. Id. at 230, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476 (emphasis by Justice Brennan).
31. 401 U.S. at 232.
32. Id. at 230.
33. Id. at 232.
34. Id.
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36. Id. at 439-42.
37. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Court, in reversing Escobedo's murder conviction,
held that:
[Where, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an un-
solved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been
taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been
denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effec-
tively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused
has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment,". . . and that no statement elicited by the police during the interroga-
tion may be used against him at a criminal trial. Id. at 490-91 (citation omitted).
38. 384 U.S. at 444, 476, 478-79. However, the Court did not deny admissibility
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Amendment39 prohibits any person from being forced to be a witness
against himself in a criminal proceeding, Miranda concluded that such
interrogation contained "inherently compelling pressures which work to
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely." 0  Against this backdrop,
the Court held that if a defendant had not been fully apprised of his
constitutional rights, there could be no inquiry into whether his state-
ments had been, in fact, coerced. 41 Rather, the statements would be
presumed compelled because they had been made unintelligently.42
The accused should at minimum be aware that he has the right to re-
main silent, that any statements made might be used as evidence
against him,4 that he has the right to the presence of an attorney during
questioning, and, if he could not afford one, that an attorney would be
appointed to represent him.4
Prior to questioning, Harris was given some but not all of the warn-
ings required by Miranda; the government failed to inform Harris that a
lawyer would be appointed for him if he were indigent.45  Conceding
that Harris' pretrial statements had been elicited in violation of the Mi-
randa rule,40 the prosecution based its case in chief on the testimony
to all confessions:
In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not purport to
find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper element in law
enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling
influences is, of course, admissible in evidence. The fundamental import of the
privilege while an individual is in custody is not whether he is allowed to talk to
the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel, but whether he can be
interrogated. There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a
police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who
calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make.
Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and
their admissibility is not affected by our holding today. Id. at 478 (footnote
omitted).
39. No person. . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
This Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was held applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
40. 384 U.S. at 467.
41. Id. at 457-58.
42. The Miranda Court felt "[i]t is only through an awareness of these consequences
[i.e., that the statements can be used against the individual] that there can be any
assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege." Id. at 469.
43. Id. at 444, 467-69, 479.
44. Id. at 444, 469-73, 479.
45. 401 U.S. at 224.
46. It is of interest that, although the district attorney conceded on appeal that the
statement was obtained in violation of Miranda (People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. at 830,
298 N.Y.S.2d at 247-48), a determination was nevertheless made by the Appellate
Division to this effect after hearing argument. Id.
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of the involved police officer.47  However, when Harris testified he re-
lated a different version of the facts. When the prosecution attempted
to introduce Harris' pretrial statements to impeach his narrative on the
stand, defense counsel objected.48  Although Harris, unlike Miranda,
was being subjected to impeachment, defense counsel relied upon the
broad holding of Miranda which apparently prohibited any use of state-
ments obtained during custodial interrogation in the absence of a full
statement of rights.
The majority acknowledged at the outset that Miranda might be
read to disallow the use of an uncounseled statement in any way.
40
But the Chief Justice, without identifying any specific portion of
the Miranda opinion to which he referred, summarily disposed of
any language in Miranda to that effect by characterizing it as mere
dicta.50 Justice Brennan strenuously disagreed with this brusque dis-
missal of Miranda. To Justice Brennan the Miranda Court had com-
pletely disposed of any distinction between those statements used in the
case in chief and those used for impeachment when it said:
"The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from
being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner. . . . [S]tate-
ments merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often
used to impeach his testimony at trial. . . . These statements are in-
criminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used
without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other
statement.51
However, because the statements considered in Miranda were used by
the prosecution in its case in chief, the question of impeachment use was
not specifically before that Court. Thus, as the Chief Justice noted in
Harris, language in Miranda capable of being construed as a prohibition
on the impeachment use was not necessary to that holding and is not
controlling in the instant case.52 Many lower courts, however, have
construed Miranda as a bar to any use of custodial statements made in
the absence of the required warnings.53
Having dismissed any possibility that Miranda might be dispositive
of the Harris case, Chief Justice Burger proceeded to authorize use
of the pretrial statements for impeachment by relying upon a 1954 Su-
47. 401 U.S. at 223.
48. See note 18 supra.
49. 401 U.S. at 224.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 230-31, quoting Miranda5 384 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis by Justice Bren-
nan).
52. See 401 U.S. at 224.
53. See notes 86-88 infra.
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preme Court decision, Walder v. United States.54 There, the defendant
Walder, like Harris, was on trial for selling narcotics. 55 Unlike Harris,
however, during direct questioning and again during cross-examination,
Walder went beyond the confines of the issues presented at his trial and
testified, of his own accord, that he had never sold or possessed nar-
cotics.5" The Court, confronted with this "sweeping claim" volunteered
by the defendant, allowed the use for impeachment purposes of evidence
regarding a heroin capsule taken from the defendant during an illegal
search and seizure5" two years earlier.58
Walder stressed that while the government could not affirmatively
use the unlawfully obtained evidence, 59 it was "quite another [matter]
54. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
55. Id. at 63.
56. Id. at 63-64.
57. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
58. 347 U.S. at 64. In the earlier proceeding, Walder had successfully moved to
suppress the evidence on the grounds that it had been obtained through an unlawful
search. The indictment in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri for the purchase and possession of one grain of heroin was thereafter dis-
missed on the Government's motion. Id. at 62-63.
59. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule prohibited such use. This rule was
delineated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), where a United States
marshal had obtained documents from the defendant's residence without a search
warrant, while the accused was detained at the station. The Weeks Court held that
since obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the documents should not have
been retained and it was error to have permitted their use at trial. In the course of
its opinion, the Court noted:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the
guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice
of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. Id. at 393.
In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), the Weeks
rule was expanded to exclude evidence obtained through information gleaned from
illegally seized items. The Silverthorne Court felt:
The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way
is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that
it shall not be used at all. 251 U.S. at 392.
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was for forty-five years considered to have
evolved from an exercise by the Supreme Court of its supervisory capacity over the
inferior federal courts. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The question of
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule's application to the states was finally resolved
when the amendment was held applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Cf. In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 879, 881, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 890, 366 P.2d 305, 306 (1961)
(Traynor, C.J., concurring).
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to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence
* . . was obtained to his own advantage," and avoid contradiction
of his untruths. 60 Application of the exclusionary rule under these
circumstances would, the Court felt, constitute a perversion of the
Fourth Amendment.6 Hence, in order to preclude the defendant
from twisting the exclusionary rule to meet his own ends, the Walder
Court permitted an exception to the rule by allowing testimony con-
cerning improperly seized evidence for impeachment purposes only.0 2
The Walder Court contrasted the situation before it with that faced
in the earlier case of Agnello v. United States 3 which prohibited the
impeachment use of similar evidence. The government in Agnello
sought support for the practice of eliciting from the defendant upon
cross-examination, testimony regarding contraband which had been pre-
viously suppressed.6 4 A unanimous Court in Agnello held that the de-
fendant could testify, meet the accusation against him, and deny all the
elements of the offense without opening the door for the introduction of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. This was true so long as the de-
fendant did not of his own accord introduce the subject of an unlawful
search. 5 While the Agnello decision was in accord with the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule, the Walder Court found it inapplicable
since Walder had gone beyond the mere denial of all the elements of
the crime charged and made the "sweeping claim" that he had never
dealt in or possessed narcotics."
The Harris Court's reliance upon Walder must be questioned since
the two cases revolve around different constitutional theories. The
Miranda objection raised by Harris asserted a Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against use of the statements. By its very terms, the Fifth Amend-
ment provision that a person may not be compelled to be a witness
against himself in any criminal case67 seems to constitute an exclu-
sionary provision. 68 On the other hand, the exclusionary rule to
60. 347 U.S. at 65.
61. Id.
62. Id. Walder has also been used as authority for the impeachment use of state-
ments obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. United States
v. Curry, 358 F.2d 904 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 873 (1966); People v.
Davis, 241 Cal. App. 2d 51, 50 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1966).
63. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
64. Id. at 29-30.
65. Id. at 35.
66. 347 U.S. at 65.
67. See note 39 supra.
68. See Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HAIv. L. REv. 935, 1030
(1966). The language of the Fifth Amendment, by prohibiting the compelling of a
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which WaIder was an exception was fashioned by the Court to imple-
ment the prohibitions in the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Such prohibitions would be meaningless un-
less some penalty were provided to prevent their infringement by
the government.69 Without discussion, however, Harris extended the
application of the Walder Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule excep-
tion to the Fifth Amendment area. Although some lower courts
had already done this, 70 action in this direction was chiefly under-
taken during the hiatus between Walder and Miranda.
In Brown v. United States,71 decided prior to Miranda, the Supreme
Court expressed its inclination to utilize Walder in the Fifth Amend-
ment arena. There, Justice Frankfurter (the author of the Wal-
der opinion) borrowed from Walder the appraisal that "there is
hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to per-
jurious testimony in reliance on the government's disability to chal-
lenge his credibility." 72  But the Justice made no attempt to explain
Walder's application to Brown, a Fifth Amendment case in which the pe-
titioner had refused to answer questions regarding Communist Party
membership on grounds of self-incrimination.73 Moreover, in Brown
person to be a witness against himself, necessarily prohibits the use of any statement
compelled from a defendant without regard to any consideration extraneous to the
Fifth Amendment itself. Id.
69. See note 59 supra.
70. E.g., Inge v. United States, 356 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v. Poe,
352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965); White v. United States, 349 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Prebish,
290 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla., 1968); cf. Rolland v. Michigan, 320 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D.
Mich. 1970), vacated and remanded, 439 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1971), for reconsideration
in the light of Harris; but see, United States v. Acuff, 410 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1969).
For the view that some cases have extended Walder to allow impeaching evidence
which directly related to the offense being tried, see Note, The Impeachment Excep-
tion to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. Cn. L. REV. 939, 940 (1967).
71. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
72. Id. at 156.
73. Id. at 152. The petitioner, defendant in a denaturalization proceeding, took the
stand and while admitting early membership in a communist-related organization, de-
nied subsequent activities until naturalization and testified she had never "taught or
advocated the overthrow of the existing government or belonged to any organization
that did so advocate, that she believed in fighting for this country and would take up
arms in its defense in event of hostilities with Soviet Russia, and that she was at-
tached to the principles of the Constitution and the good order and happiness of the
United States." Id. at 150. Although she had previously refused to answer questions
regarding the periods subsequent to the time of her naturalization on Fifth Amendment
grounds, the government cross-examined her by asking whether she was or ever had
been a member of the Communist Party of the United States, and questioned her
about activities since naturalization, all of which she refused to answer, claiming the
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the petitioner made no claims which flouted the government's inability
to introduce evidence; she merely claimed the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege and refused to answer questions propounded to her. Thus it ap-
pears that the sentiment, rather than the holding, of Walder was evoked
in this decision.
In Smith v. United States,74 however, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals squarely faced the question whether Walder's rationale
should be extended into the Fifth Amendment area. There, the
court allowed impeachment of the defendant with inconsistent state-
ments contained in an affidavit required from indigent defendants de-
siring to subpoena witnesses, despite the objection that the defendant
had been compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment to make
the statements. The court recognized that Walder was not directly in
point, but felt that its underlying rationale was dispositive since the de-
fendant "was not compelled to make a false statement. '75
With the advent of Miranda, doubts arose concerning the continued
viability of Walder in the Fifth Amendment area. Miranda did not
mention either Walder or cases which extended its application to Fifth
Amendment situations. Thus post-Miranda courts were divided on the
issue of whether Walder still authorized impeachment by statements ob-
tained in the absence of Miranda warnings.7 While Walder had
been extended beyond its Fourth Amendment holding into the Fifth
Amendment area before Miranda, many courts now recognized a dis-
tinction between the requirements of the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments.
77
self-incrimination privilege. The District Court ruled that by taking the stand in her
own defense she had abandoned the privilege and directed her to answer; upon her
refusal, she was found in contempt. The court of appeals upheld the conviction, and
the Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 157.
74. 312 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
75. Id. at 870-71 (emphasis added).
76. See notes 86-88 infra.
77. E.g., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 428 Pa.
458, 239 A.2d 308 (1968), reversed a first degree murder conviction and ordered a new
trial, where the Commonwealth used a written confession obtained in the absence of
some of Miranda's procedural safeguards to impeach the trial testimony of the de-
fendant. In its opinion, the Court discussed the distinction between the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, and the logic of its analysis cannot be denied:
In Wright, in line with Walder v. United States we ruled that evidence seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment may be used under certain circum-
stances to impeach credibility. Wright and Walder are inapposite to situations
involving violations of the Fifth Amendment which, unlike the Fourth Amend-
ment, is by its terms directed at excluding evidence rather than at deterring the
police from official misconduct. The use of a confession obtained under circum-
stances violative of the Fifth Amendment for impeachment purposes is as much a
[Vol. 5
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An example of a post-Miranda decision finding that statements
obtained in violation of Miranda could not be used for any purpose in-
cluding impeachment, is Groshart v. United States.78 Groshart was
on trial for smuggling drugs into the United States from Mexico. His
trial testimony concerning his acquisition of the contraband-laden ve-
hicle he was driving when arrested differed from the story he related
to the arresting customs agent. 79 However, prior to his interrogation
at the border, Groshart had not been fully advised pursuant to Mi-
randa. He had not been told of his right to have counsel present
during interrogation or, if he could not afford counsel, that counsel
would be appointed to represent him.8°  The district court allowed
certain pretrial statements to be admitted for the limited purpose
of impeachment, carefully instructing the jury not to use the evi-
dence to establish guilt."
The jury found the defendant guilty of the crimes charged and he
appealed to the circuit court.82 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in admitting the
illegally obtained evidence even for the limited purpose of impeaching
the defendant. The court, rejecting the government's request to dis-
tinguish between the holding and the dicta of Miranda, held that the
express language83 of that decision forbids the use, under all circum-
stances, of evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
84
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination as is its use during the Com-
monwealth's case in chief. Id. at 309 (citations omitted).
78. 392 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1968).
79. Id. at 174.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 173.
83. The express Miranda language relied upon by the court is as follows:
In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often
used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement
given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These state-
ments are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be
used without the full warnings and effective waiver required for any other state-
ment. 384 U.S. at 477, quoted at 392 F.2d at 177-78 (emphasis added).
Yet, later in its opinion the Groshart court stated that its conclusion was "impelled
. . . by the force of Miranda." Id. at 179 (emphasis added). This would tend to
indicate reliance on the dicta of Miranda rather than its holding. The dissent in
Groshart pointed out:
Neither in the main opinion, nor in any of the three dissenting opinions in
Miranda is the word "impeach" found, with the single exception of a tangential
reference in the majority opinion. Id. at 181.
The "tangential reference" alluded to is the inclusion of the word "impeach" in the
language relied on by the Groshart majority.
84. 392 F.2d at 178. The specific language of the court's holding in Groshart was:
Accordingly, we hold that if statements are obtained from a defendant in vio-
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The court also felt that the Walder rationale relied upon by the gov-
ernment had been "undermined" by Miranda."'
Although most states6 and federals" courts followed reasoning similar
to that expounded by the Ninth Circuit in Groshart, a respectable mi-
nority of the states and the Second Circuit shared the view of Chief
Justice Burger in Harris.8  A matter of puzzlement about the Chief
Justice's opinion in Harris is its failure to employ the ramifications of
the Court's earlier decision in Harrison v. United States,89 which, by
lation of the Miranda rules and if the interrogation relates to an offense for
which the defendant is ultimately brought to trial, those statements, as well as
any portions thereof, may not be used against the defendant at the trial for any
purpose whatsoever. Id. (footnote omitted).
The breadth of the Groshart holding was, however, slightly qualified:
Of course, the inability of the prosecution to use the defendant's statements would
not prevent their admission where the defendant himself voluntarily seeks their
introduction. We need not consider whether the fact of the existence, or even the
content, of the statements should become available for use by the prosecution in the
"unusual situation," recently considered by the Second Circuit, "where the de-
fendant's testimony puts in issue the very question of what he told the police."
Id. at 178 n.4, quoting United States v. Armetta, 378 F.2d 658, 662 (2d Cir.
1967).
85. 392 F.2d at 178.
86. People v. Barry, 237 Cal. App. 2d 154, 46 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1965), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1024 (1967) (relying on Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)); Velarde
v. People, 466 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1970); State v. Galasso, 217 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1968);
People v. Luna, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967) (expressly reserving decision
on this point); Franklin v. State, 6 Md. App. 572, 252 A.2d 487 (1969); People v.
Wilson, 20 Mich. App. 410, 174 N.W.2d 79 (1969); State v. Catrett, 276 N.C. 86,
171 S.E.2d 398 (1970); State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d 581 (1967), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 943 (1967); Commonwealth v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209
(1968); Spann v. State, 448 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Cr. App. 1969); Cardwell v. Common-
wealth, 209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968); Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159,
150 N.W.2d 370 (1967). See also Kelly v. King, 196 So. 2d 525 (Miss. 1967).
87. Agius v. United States, 413 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1969); Fowle v. United States,
410 F.2d 48, 52 (9th Cir. 1969) (not specifically mentioning Miranda, but stating that
"the present validity of the doctrine [of Walder] is extremely questionable."); Breed-
love v. Beto, 404 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1968); Proctor v. United States, 404 F.2d 819
(D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1968); Blair v.
United States, 401 F.2d 387 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470
(3d Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. United States, 382 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1967). See also
Dillon v. United States, 391 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1968) (where the court said that
Walder "contained the standards for impeachment by prior statements illegally ob-
tained," inasmuch as Miranda had not been decided when the trial occurred); Rolland
v. Michigan, 320 F. Supp. 1195 (E.D. Mich. 1970); Hunt v. Cox, 312 F . Supp. 637
(E.D. Va. 1970).
88. United States v. Vanterpool, 394 F.2d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 1968); United States
v. Armetta, 378 F.2d 658, 661-62 (2d Cir. 1967); State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J. Super.
57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970); State v. Butler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969);
State v. Grant, 459 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1969). But see United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d
97 (2d Cir. 1968).
89. 392 U.S. 219 (1968). Harrison was convicted of murder after a jury trial in the
District of Columbia District Court, at which trial three confessions purported to have
NOTES
implication, presaged Harris. Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Harrison,
noted:
Similarly, an inadmissible confession preceding a plea of guilty would
taint the plea. And, as a final consequence, today's decision would
seem to bar the use of confessions defective under Miranda or Mallory
from being used for impeachment when a defendant takes the stand and
deliberately lies.90
In response to Justice White's suggestion, Justice Stewart, speaking for
the majority, said: "[W]e decide here only a case in which the prosecu-
tion illegally introduced the defendant's confession in evidence against
him at trial in its case-in-chief"91  This implicit recognition by the
Warren Court that the impeachment use of statements obtained in
violation of the Fifth Amendment was not a settled issue, and thus not
controlled by Miranda, was not capitalized upon by Chief Justice
Burger in Harris.
Even if Miranda does not preclude the use of illegally obtained in-
tangible evidence for impeachment purposes, the Chief Justice's reli-
ance on Walder for this proposition raises an additional problem. In
Walder the defendant took the stand and, on direct examination, "made
the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in or possessed any nar-
cotics."92  On cross-examination the government, over the defend-
ant's objection, questioned the defendant about the heroin capsule il-
legally seized two years earlier. The defendant denied that any nar-
cotics were ever taken from him at that time. The government then
offered contradicting testimony by one of the officers who had par-
ticipated in the unlawful search and seizure. The trial judge al-
been made by him while in police custody were admitted in evidence. On the advice
of counsel, and to rebut these confessions, the defendant took the stand and gave his
own version of the events leading to the victim's death, which testimony placed the
defendant, shotgun in hand, at the scene of the killing. Harrison's conviction was
reversed on appeal, on the ground that the three confessions had been illegally ob-
tained. Harrison v. United States, 359 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Two were held
inadmissible under Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), and admission of
the third was held to violate a prior en banc decision of the Court of Appeals, 392
U.S. at 220 n.2. On remand, Harrison was again convicted after a trial in which his
prior testimony was read over objection, which conviction was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. 387 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1967). The Supreme Court, on certiorari, re-
versed, holding that the defendant's trial testimony was inadmissible as the fruit of
the illegally procured confessions, under Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920), and Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 392
U.S. at 222, 226.
90. 392 U.S. at 234.
91. Id. at 223 n.9.
92. 347 U.S. at 63.
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lowed this extrinsic evidence solely for the purpose of impeaching the
defendant's testimony on direct examination and carefully instructed
the jury to that effect.93  The Supreme Court affirmed, limiting
its exception to the exclusionary rule to situations where the il-
legally obtained evidence is offered to impeach the defendant on mat-
ters collateral94 to the crime charged, i.e., where the defendant's testi-
mony does more than deny the elements of the crime for which he is
93. Id. at 64.
94. The Walder Court did not expressly state that the matter about which Walder
was impeached was "collateral." Wigmore has stated the test of what is collateral as
follows: "Could the fact as to which error is predicated, have been shown in evidence
for any purpose independently of the contradiction?" 3 J. WiGMoRE, EvIDENC
§ 1003 (3d ed. 1940). Hence, since the Government in Walder could not intro-
duce the illegally obtained evidence in its case in chief or for any other purpose
except to show self-contradiction, the subject matter of the impeaching evidence was
collateral to the issues in Walder.
In the Supreme Court, counsel for Walder also argued that, aside from the exclusion-
ary rule, general rules of evidence prohibited impeachment on collateral matters
through the utilization of extrinsic evidence. 98 L. Ed. at 504. The Walder Court did
not directly confront this objection. However, the Court appeared to answer the
contention in a footnote where it quoted a passage from Michelson v. United States,
335 U.S. 469 (1948):
The price a defendant must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to
throw open the entire subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and
to make himself vulnerable where the law otherwise shields him. Id. at 479.
From this the Walder Court reasoned:
The underlying rationale of the Michelson case also disposes of the evidentiary
question raised by petitioner, to wit, "whether defendant's actual guilt under a
former indictment which was dismissed may be proved by extrinsic evidence in-
troduced to impeach him in a prosecution for a subsequent offense." 347 U.S. at
65 n.3.
Generally, apart from any consideration of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclu-
sionary rules, collateral impeachment through the use of extrinsic contradictory evi-
dence or of prior inconsistent statements was not possible. This rule of inad-
missibility was based on policy objections: the possibility of unfair surprise, confusion
of issues, and undue consumption of time. B. WrrKtN, CALIFORNIA EVMFNCn § 1259
(2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as WrrxiN]. Under California law, some cases al-
lowed the trial judge to have some measure of discretion to allow or prevent cross-
examination on collateral matters. "But extrinsic evidence was held inadmissible,
pursuant to an inflexible rule of exclusion." WrrniN, supra § 1259. This inflexible
rule of exclusion appears to be the majority rule. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENcE § 47
(1954). However, an apparent exception to this rule is found where the defendant-
witness on direct examination makes a statement not relevant to the crime for
which he is being tried. In such a situation it is said that the "offering party
on direct examination opened the 'door' or the 'gates,' and that the adverse party
is 'fighting fire with fire'. . . ." WXIN, supra § 1267. The Walder situation seems
to fall within this "opening the door" exception to the rule of inadmissibility, and
the Court's use of the Michelson decision indicates that this exception is the basis of
the rejection of Walder's contention that extrinsic evidence is inadmissible for impeach-
ment on collateral matters. However, the Court did indicate an additional basis for
the rejection of Walder's contention when it said:
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being tried.05 Had the impeaching evidence in Walder been offered
to rebut the defendant's denial of some or all elements of the crime
for which he was being tried, and that evidence related to such ele-
ments, it is clear that the result in Walder would have been quite dif-
ferent.
In Harris, Chief Justice Burger, indignant over what he considered
to be the sharp contrast between Harris' trial testimony and his earlier
statements,9 forbore from applying the limits to the Walder holding.
The Chief Justice acknowledged that Walder was impeached on "col-
lateral matters" included in his direct testimony, while Harris was im-
peached "as to testimony bearing more directly on the crimes
charged." 97  However, the Chief Justice was not "persuaded that
there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different from
that reached by the Court in Walder,"95 and thus refused to limit the
impeachment use of illegally obtained evidence to only those matters
collateral to the crime charged.
Justice Brennan also recognized that Walder was impeached on
collateral matters, while Harris was impeached on matters bearing
directly on the crime for which he was charged.99 In his view, the
Walder Court expressly limited its holding to collateral impeachment
Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant af-
firmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's dis-
ability to challenge his credibility. 347 U.S. at 65 (emphasis added).
Because Walder "opened the door" by his sweeping claim on direct examination, his
credibility was put into question. Since the defendant-witness' credibility is always
relevant and non-collateral, his credibility may be challenged by extrinsic evidence.
WrrgiN, supra § 1261.
The California Evidence Code has eliminated the distinction between matters col-
lateral and matters directly relating to the crime charged. The inflexible rule requiring
the exclusion of extrinsic evidence to impeach on matters collateral to the crime has
also been eliminated. Under the Evidence Code, the trial judge is given general dis-
cretion to exclude any evidence in order to prevent confusion of issues or undue con-
sumption of time. CAL. Evm. CODE § 352 (West 1968). "[Hience, [the trial judge]
may either allow or refuse to permit impeachment on a collateral matter in any par-
ticular situation." WrriuN, supra § 1259.
95. 347 U.S. at 65-66.
96. 401 U.S. at 225.
97. Id.
98. Id. This has not always been Chief Justice Burger's view. In Lockley v. United
States, 270 F.2d 915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (finding a written confession, introduced
by the prosecution solely for impeachment purposes, to be voluntary) (dissenting
opinion), the Chief Justice said:
It is my view that [the trial judge should] . . . receive in evidence only that part
of the written statement which does not go to the admission of acts which con-
stitute necessary elements of the crime itself. . . . Id.
99. 401 U.S. at 228.
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and this limitation was compelled by the Constitution.100 The Walder
Court said:
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest oppor-
tunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to deny
all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave
to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally
secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chief.1 1
Even though the Walder Court did not identify the specific constitu-
tional provision which it felt guaranteed the defendant the fullest op-
portunity to meet the accusation against him and to deny freely all
the elements of the case, Justice Brennan determined that Miranda
had identified the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrim-
ination as such a provision.'"'
Justice Brennan viewed this privilege as "fulfilled only when an
accused is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to
speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.' ,,103 From this premise
Justice Brennan concluded that this privilege is violated when
the decision whether to take the stand is burdened by the risk that an
illegally obtained prior statement may be introduced to impeach his di-
rect testimony denying complicity in the crime charged against him.
10 4
In his view, this proposition is supported by Miranda, wherein it was
noted that statements intended to be exculpatory are often utilized
for impeachment purposes at trial and that such statements "'are in-
criminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used
without the full warnings."'"05
Chief Justice Burger also considered the Fifth Amendment as en-
compassing the right to voluntarily choose whether or not to testify.100
Once the criminal defendant chooses to testify in his own defense, ac-
cording to the Chief Justice, "that privilege cannot be construed to in-
clude the right to commit perjury."'11 7 The assumption underlying such a
100. Id. at 228-29.
101. 347 U.S. at 65.
102. 401 U.S. at 229.
103. Id. at 230, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (emphasis by
Justice Brennan).
104. 401 U.S. at 230.
105. Id., quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis by Justice Brennan is
deleted). Since Justice Brennan felt that Miranda excluded the use of the statement
in any manner, he found it unnecessary to consider petitioner's argument that Miranda
had overruled the "narrow exception [of Walder] ... admitting impeaching evidence
on collateral matters." 401 U.S. at 230 n.3.




view, however, is that the defendant's trial testimony is a prevarication
while the prior inconsistent statement elicited during custodial interroga-
tion is the truth. This assumption is a direct refutation of the pre-
dominant theme of Miranda. There, one of the stated reasons for
the required warnings was the presumed unreliability of statements ob-
tained during in-custody interrogations. 10 8  The inherent pressures
of such a situation were felt to be too conducive to an unintelligent,
involuntary, and hence, unreliable rendition of facts by a defendant
concerned only with terminating the interrogational process.10 9 The
Miranda warnings were created to prevent the admissibility of such
statements. Without these warnings, any statements made by the de-
fendant would be conclusively presumed to be unintelligent, involun-
tary, or mentally coerced so as to render them unreliable and in-
admissible. 10  With such warnings, any statements made thereafter
would at least be made by a defendant cognizant of his right to be
silent and to obtain counsel, and in effect would constitute a waiver.
However, such an uncounseled waiver would nevertheless create doubt
regarding the statements' reliability and consequent availability for
admission into evidence."' Thus to assume, as the Chief Justice
necessarily must in Harris, that the criminal defendant who testifies
to facts inconsistent with his prior statements, elicited without Mi-
randa warnings, is committing perjury, is to presume the reliability of
the prior statement in contravention of Miranda. Here, however, lies the
possible justification for admitting illegally obtained tangible evidence for
108. Although some question whether the exclusion required by the Fifth Amend-
ment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, rests on any considerations of reliability
(Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical
Evidence from a Suspect, 43 S. CAL. L. REv. 597, 603 (1970); Driver, Confessions and
the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv. L. REv. 42, 43 (1968); cf., Comment,
Inherent Coercion and Third Party Standing to Assert Escobedo and Miranda, 41 S.
CAL. L. R-v. 917, 923 (1968)), the Miranda Court specifically recognized that the
interrogation procedures which they were at pains to eliminate might give rise to a
false confession, 384 U.S. at 455 n.24, and in providing that an accused should have
knowledge of his right to have counsel present, the Court said:
mhe assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness.
The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives
a fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported
by the prosecution at trial. Id. at 470.
See Note, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules, 34 U. CHI. L. REv.
939, 948-49 (1967).
109. 384 U.S. at 455.
110. This theme runs through the Miranda opinion. Id. at 457-58, 461, 468-69,
474, 476.
111. See Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56
CALIF. L. REv. 579, 602 (1968).
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impeachment purposes. Physical evidence, although obtained in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment, is nonetheless reliable.112  Since the
reason for the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is not the inherent
unreliability of unlawfully obtained physical evidence,"18 such evidence
arguably could be admitted solely for impeachment purposes.
Clearly Justice Brennan is correct. Miranda disallows an assump-
tion that the defendant who testifies inconsistently with a prior un-
lawfully obtained statement is committing perjury. Such an assumption
cannot justify the admission of illegally procured statements for impeach-
ment purposes in light of the Fifth Amendment guarantee that the ac-
cused enjoys "the right to 'remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will.' ",14 If the accused knows that
any earlier, possibly unintelligent, statement, bearing directly on the
crime for which he is on trial and made in the hostile atmosphere of
police custody, could be used to impeach him should he choose to
testify, he may very likely be deterred from taking the stand. While even
the Walder decision, which limits the impeachment use of unlawfully ob-
tained evidence to collateral matters, might make the decision to testify
difficult, allowing impeachment evidence bearing directly on the crime
charged seems to negate the element of choice. Further, it was held
in Miranda that the Constitution requires that prior to any ques-
tioning, "the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
[and] that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him. . .",1 If these warnings are not given to a defendant prior
to questioning, and should he make potentially damaging statements
bearing directly on the crime with which he is charged, the defendant
would suddenly realize at the time of trial that he ought not to exercise
his constitutional right to testify since his in-custody statements could
then be used against him.
112. McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Con-
fessions, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 239, 273 (1946); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in
Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665, 666 (1970); 28 MINN. L. Rnv. 73,
76 (1943).
113. Rather, the reasons given for the Fourth Amendment rule are (1) the deter-
rent value on illegal police conduct (Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42-44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)), and (2) the necessity for maintaining the
integrity of the judicial system. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961); Elkins v.
United States, supra at 222-23 (1960). Dann, The Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination: Extorting Physical Evidence From a Suspect, 43 S. CAL.
L. REv. 597, 602-03 (1970).
114. 401 U.S. at 230, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
115. 384 U.S. at 444.
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The effect on the jury of admitting illegally obtained statements bear-
ing directly on the crime charged could be disastrous for the defend-
ant, even with the most careful admonition to the jury that such state-
ments are not offered to prove the truth of the matter stated but only
for the purpose of impeaching the witness. For example, in Harris,
the illegally obtained statement amounted almost to a full confession.
If the Harris jury believed the impeaching statements, despite being
carefully instructed, they would have no real alternative but to find
the defendant guilty.116 Contrast this with a jury in a Walder situation
who might consider the defendant less credible, but, since the impeach-
ing evidence related to an earlier, completely unrelated incident, might
very likely acquit. While, as Chief Justice Burger pointed out, "[tlhe
impeachment process here undoubtedly provided valuable aid to the jury
in assessing petitioner's credibility,"' 7 Harris had been compelled, in
any meaningful sense of the words, to be a witness against himself in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.
An additional objection to extending the Walder rationale to embrace
Miranda violations is the effect such a result would have on unlawful
police conduct.
Since their inception, the exclusionary rules of the fourth and fifth
amendments have been recognized as a principal mode of discourag-
ing lawless police conduct. Thus, their major thrust is a deter-
rent one.118
116. Appellate courts have often recognized that juries may encounter difficulty in
distinguishing various purposes for which evidence is presented to them. See, e.g.,
Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 632 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting opinion); Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Grune-
wald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957); United States v. Sanchez, 349 F.2d 354,
357 (2d Cir. 1965); Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915, 920 (D.C. Cir. 1959)
(Burger, J., dissenting opinion). Defendants are not, however, compelled to take
the stand, and the reasoning of many courts seems to be that if defendants open the
door, the prosecution is invited to walk in. See note 94 supra. Nevertheless, it ap-
pears that the jury faces a nigh impossible task when instructed to close its eyes to
the fact that evidence introduced for a limited purpose is highly damaging on the
ultimate issue of guilt as well. "'The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can
be overcome by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be an
unmitigated fiction."' Kirulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson,
J., concurring), quoted in Riddell v. Rhay, 404 U.S. 974, 977 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (order denying petition for writ of certiorari).
117. 401 U.S. at 225.
118. Cole, Impeaching with Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: Some Reflections
on the Palatable Fruit of the Poisonous Tree, 18 DEPAUL L. Rlv. 25, 35 (1968) (foot-
note omitted).
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In Harris, Chief Justice Burger views this objection as highly conjectural.
In his view the benefits of the impeachment process "should not be lost,
* . , because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police
conduct will be encouraged thereby." 119 The Chief Justice felt that
the unavailability of the illegally obtained evidence for the prosecu-
tion's case in chief would be sufficient to deter prohibited police con-
duct, assuming the existence of any deterrent value.' 20
However, in Justice Brennan's view, the constitutional underpinning
of the privilege against self-incrimination (the "essential mainstay" of our
adversary system) "'is the respect a government must accord to the dig-
nity and integrity of its citizens.' ",121 To Justice Brennan, "[t]hese val-
ues are plainly jeopardized if an exception against admission of tainted
statements is made for those used for impeachment purposes,"' 22 and
the resultant abetting of lawbreaking police officers by the courts would
be "monstrous."'12 3 To the extent that Miranda was aimed at deterring
unconscionable police conduct, Justice Brennan felt that the Harris
decision
will seriously undermine the achievement of that objective. The Court
today tells the police that they may freely interrogate an accused incom-
municado and without counsel and know that although any statement
they obtain in violation of Miranda cannot be used on the State's direct
case, it may be introduced if the defendant has the temerity to testify
in his own defense. This goes far toward undoing much of the progress
made in conforming police methods to the Constitution. 1
24
This deterrent value, at first a reason for the implementation of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules and now a rationale
for their continued existence, has engendered recent and widespread
criticism. 2  These criticisms are aimed not at the theory of deterrence
via exclusion, but rather at its success. Based upon empirical evi-
dence, the realization that the exclusionary rules are not deterring un-
119. 401 U.S. at 225.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 231-32, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
122. Id. at 232.
123. Id. Contra, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.
388, 411 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule it
Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970).
124. 401 U.S. at 232.
125. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411
(1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Bums, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19
DEPAUL L. REv. 80 (1969); Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 53 CALiF. L. REV. 929, 951-53 (1965); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule
in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1970).
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lawful police conduct as once thought, is becoming more and more evi-
dent.'26 However, the failure of the Fifth Amendment exclusionary
rule to effectively deter unlawful police conduct is not in itself a reason
for its abandonment. If the exclusionary rule of the Fifth Amendment is
considered to be an integral part of that Amendment, then once vio-
lated, the Amendment itself rather than the underlying goals of deter-
rence and preservation of the integrity of the judicial system commands
exclusion. 12  However, if the Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule, like
the Fourth, is considered to be a court-made doctrine, fashioned to im-
plement and protect the prohibitions embodied in its terms, then the
rule's success in deterring unlawful police conduct would be a major
factor relevant to its retention. 28 If this is the nature of the Fifth
Amendment exclusionary rule, and assuming the validity of the recent
empirical criticisms, then Chief Justice Burger's denegration of the im-
portance of the rule's deterrent value seems well-founded.
Though Harris permits the use of prior inconsistent statements se-
cured in violation of Miranda for impeachment purposes on matters
collateral or matters directly relating to the crime charged, the use is not
unlimited. Chief Justice Burger injected the limitation that such use
be confined to statements otherwise shown to be "trustworthy."'2 9
While a blind extension of Walder might allow the impeachment use of
statements considered to be coerced even before Miranda,130 any such
126. For instance, many situations in which the police intervene, such as quieting
noisy parties, helping drunks, returning runaways and settling family squabbles, are not
likely to give rise to an application of the exclusionary rule. Oaks, supra note 125, at
720. In addition, the lawless activities of a corrupt police department are unlikely to
be affected by the exclusionary rule. Although an exclusionary rule had long been
enforced in a most rigorous fashion in Illinois, the Chicago police department was, in
the Fifties, felt to be the most demoralized, graft-ridden and inefficient among
larger cities, and many forms of grave police misconduct were attributed to the Chicago
policemen. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searches-A Comment
on People vs. Cahan, 43 CALiF. L. REv. 565, 585-86 (1955). And, of course, the
exclusionary rule only benefits those incriminated by evidence which has been ille-
gally obtained. No recompense is provided for the injury suffered by one who has
been the subject of an illegal search which revealed no incriminating items. Oaks,
supra note 125, at 736.
127. See note 68 supra.
128. See note 118 supra and accompanying text. Cf. McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1942) (the Court, relying upon its supervisory power over the federal
courts, excluded a confession obtained in violation of federal statutes on the grounds,
inter alia, that it would demean the integrity of the court to admit such confessions);
Developments in the Law--Confessions, 79 HtIv. L. REv. 935, 988, 995, 1030 (1966).
129. 401 U.S. at 224.
130. That such use was possible is indicated by implication in United States v.
Curry, 358 F.2d 904, 912 (2d Cir. 1966):
It is true that, if a prior admission were found to be unconstitutionally coerced,
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application of Walder would be qualified by the pre-Miranda requirement
of voluntariness. Chief Justice Burger did not, however, define exactly
what he had in mind when he said, "provided of course . . . the
trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards.'
131
The Miranda warnings were designed to obviate a case-by-case de-
termination of the voluntariness of a confession elicited during cus-
todial interrogation. 3 2  Since Harris involved a Miranda violation, and
the statements were nevertheless allowed before the jury for impeach-
ment, the Chief Justice appears to have intended a return to pre-Mi-
randa standards of admissibility. This would require the court to deter-
mine, prior to the introduction of the statements, whether the state-
ments were voluntarily made. A pre-Miranda voluntariness inquiry
would not be resolved by a mere finding that an accused was un-
aware of his rights under the Constitution. Rather, the court would
again be considering whether the government had engaged in overt
compulsion in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Or perhaps the self-
incrimination aspect of the Fifth Amendment would no longer be con-
sidered and the court would again be determining only whether the re-
liability of the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due
process.
133
After Miranda was decided 13 4 Congress spoke on the subject of the
admissibility of confessions and the determination of voluntariness.
In 1968, section 3501 was added to Title 18 of the United States
the substantial possibility that the admission is no more reliable than the contrary
testimony of the accused at trial should lead a court to proceed with caution in
permitting its use for impeachment purposes.
131. The full context of this statement by Chief Justice Burger is as follows:
It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in
the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all purposes, provided of course that
the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards. 401 U.S. at 224.
132. See text accompanying notes 35-44 supra.
133. See note 130 supra. The following cases illustrate some of the grounds on
which statements have been excluded under a due process theory: Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528 (1963) (coercive bargaining); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963)
(lack of free and reasoned choice due to use of truth serum); Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199 (1960) (defendant's unique weaknesses); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S.
315 (1959) (official pressure, fatigue and emotional tricks); Brown v. Mississippi,
297 U.S. 278 (1936) (torture).
134. The Miranda Court stated:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of
their creative rule-making capacities. . . .However, unless we are shown other
procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the follow-
ing safeguards must be observed. 384 U.S. at 467.
NOTES
Code in an attempt by Congress to mitigate the judicially-pronounced
constitutional requirements of recent cases. 135 The function of de-
termining admissibility of confessions was returned to the trial judge for
individual case-by-case consideration, and guidelines were laid down to
be used by federal judges in determining the issue of voluntariness.13 6
Subsection (b) of section 3501 delineates some specific circum-
stances which should be considered by the judge in making his de-
termination. These factors include the time elapsing between arrest
and arraignment if the confession occurred during that time, and whether
the defendant knew the nature of the offense at the time of making the
confession. More importantly, Congress did not omit from its enu-
meration of items to be considered (1) whether the defendant was ad-
vised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that
any such statement could be used against him; (2) whether the defendant
had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of
counsel; and (3) whether the defendant had assistance of counsel when
questioned and when giving the confession. 1 3 7 Section 3501 (b) con-
cludes by declaring: "The presence or absence of any of the above-
mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not
be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession."'
138
Federal judges, in their search for a measurement of voluntariness,
may find this section controlling.13 9 Judges in state courts should find
it helpful. And if "trustworthiness" translates to "voluntariness," Mi-
randa's teachings may still play a part in the impeachment use of con-
fessions although, as in pre-Miranda times, the issue of voluntariness
will again be resolved through a case-by-case consideration of all the
circumstances surrounding the giving of a statement.
An issue to be decided in cases arising after Harris is the bearing that
drugs or intoxicants will have in determining voluntariness. If ad-
135. See 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2127 (1968).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970). This section was part of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Title H, § 701(a), 82 Stat. 210.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1970). These words are strangely reminiscent of
Miranda. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1970).
139. Indeed, where Congress and the Court disagree about the interpretation of the
Due Process Clause, the Court may well defer to the Congressional version (§ 3501).
See Burt, Miranda and Title IL A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 81 (dis-
cussing the implications of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), upon Miranda
and Title 11 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968). However,
in light of Miranda's strong Fifth Amendment foundation, the constitutionality of
section 3501 is questionablo.
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missibility rests, even partially, on an element of knowingness (in-
telligence) any impairment of a defendant's faculties should weigh in
the balance. It is well established that the presence of these items re-
moves some of the element of free choice, 140 and evidence obtained from
a person addicted to hard drugs while in the throes of withdrawal may
be similarly tainted. Though Harris did not claim to have spoken other
than voluntarily, inquiry at trial about his bad memory elicited a curious
response: "[MJy joints was down and I needed drugs.'1 4' Had Harris'
objections not been confined to alleged violations of New York pro-
cedural rules and the tenets of Miranda, 42 a judicial journey into
areas of voluntariness might well have resulted in exclusion of the state-
ments.
An additional issue yet to be resolved is whether the Harris rule en-
compasses a defendant who takes the stand and merely denies the
charges against him without elaboration. The Harris Court's failure to
adhere to the requirement in Walder that the defendant must be able
to deny all of the elements of the crime might indicate that a mere
denial would allow the admission of earlier "trustworthy" statements.143
However, any such impeachment would seem to be expressly prohibited
by Walder,14 and would thus require a severe limitation of the prin-
ciples underlying that decision. If a mere denial does not allow a
"Harris" impeachment, the moment when a contradiction becomes of
such consequence as to allow impeachment under the Harris standard is
a further issue left unresolved by the instant decision.
One member of the Harris majority, Justice Harlan, had voiced his
"hope that the Court will eventually return to constitutional paths which,
until recently, it has followed throughout its history.' 45  The Court
seems to have embarked on this journey. Harris presages a whittling
140. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). See also People v. Conley, 64 Cal.
2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966) (intoxication as negating specific in-
tent to commit a crime).
141. 401 U.S. at 227 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
142. See note 18 supra.
143. But see Lockley v. United States, 270 F.2d 915, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (Burger,
J., dissenting):
The defendant should not be permitted to commit profitable perjury with im-
punity, but he must be permitted to deny the criminal act charged without
thereby giving leave to the government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence
otherwise inadmissible.
144. 347 U.S. at 65.
145. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 617 (1965) (concurring opinion) (prose-




away of the doctrines growing out of Weeks146 and engenders a feeling
that one more battle in the war against crime has been won. But what
is the cost? In the words of Justice Douglas:
The exclusionary rule [of the Fifth Amendment] is a recognition that
the vision of law enforcement authorities is often narrowed by their
total immersion in the never-ending war against crime. If we permit
the legitimate desire to win that war to undermine constitutional guar-
antees of liberty, our victory will indeed be fleeting.
147
Martha A. Roof
146. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
147. Riddell v. Rhay, 404 U.S. 974, 977-78 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (order
denying petition for writ of certiorari).
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